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The Progressive Critique  
of the Current Socio-legal Landscape:  
Corporations and Racial Justice∗ 
 
Cheryl I. Harris1 
I have the honor of serving as the director of the Critical Race Studies 
Concentration at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.  
Over the past decade in teaching, as well as in my prior life as an attorney, I 
have spent a lot of time thinking, writing, and talking about race.  I have 
spent relatively little time thinking about the issue of corporations.  I am 
new to this conversation and I would describe myself as not necessarily 
fully bilingual. 
What I want to offer here are maybe just some tentative thoughts, perhaps 
more reflections on the topic, in terms of thinking about the relationship 
between corporations and racial justice. 
I begin by placing my remarks in the context of my teaching experiences.  
I teach constitutional law and employment discrimination.  Both courses are 
concerned with the issues of equality.  One deals with the basic framework 
of the Constitution of the United States,2 while the other deals with a 
statute, specifically Title VII, which bans discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, and disability in the workplace.3 
In viewing corporations and racial equality through the lens of these two 
bodies of law, one could say that you get a very complex and contradictory 
picture in terms of the relationship between corporations and racial justice.   
On one hand, one could look through the lens of a particular kind of story 
about constitutional law and see the corporation as a form of organized 
capital that is infinitely about wealth maximization—a way of diffusing 
ownership and responsibility by spreading wealth and risk.  And through 
this kind of entity of modernization and progress there is a story in which 
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one could say that corporations have opposed racial inequality as inherently 
inefficient, backwards, and out of step with what it takes to build capital.   
There is also a story in which private property and capitalism in the free 
markets generate racial progress.  This is a story that corporations like to 
highlight and one that has both old and new versions in terms of 
constitutional law. 
The old version of the story is one than can be told through Plessy v. 
Ferguson.4  Plessy involved a Louisiana statute that mandated segregation 
in intrastate railroad travel.  It required the state to provide equal but 
separate accommodations on the basis of race for all railroads traveling 
through the State of Louisiana.5 
The lawyers and activists who saw the law adopted in 1890 correctly 
recognized it as yet another step in the effort to dismantle the progress that 
had been made during Reconstruction.6  So, they sought to band together 
and set up a test case.7 
One of the principal lawyers in the case, who looked at cases prior to 
Plessy in an attempt to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, correctly 
understood that the court was going to be very hostile to an equal protection 
claim.  Looking at the cases preceding Plessy, it was very clear that the 
court had no interest in making a robust interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that would be friendly to an argument that said separation on 
the basis of race violated equal protection.8 
Reading the trend in the court’s decisions, the lawyer decided to speak a 
language that they understood and embraced, and that was the language of 
property.9  Albion Tourgée, one of the lawyers on the case, argued that the 
challenger in the case should be white.10  In other words, the person put up 
to challenge the law in Plessy should have been a person who appeared to 
be white; that is, the person should have been phenotypically white, so that 
the train conductor’s assignment of that person to a car reserved for blacks 
could be challenged on the grounds that it was a deprivation of property.11   
That is, assigning a person that looked to be white to a train car reserved for 
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those being black was, in fact, depriving that person of the reputation of 
being regarded as white.12 
The case then proceeded on two theories: one, an argument of equal 
protection; and two, an argument about deprivation of property.13  Of 
course, as you would know, neither argument was successful.  So why am I 
telling this story? 
I am telling this story because in order for the law in Plessy to be 
challenged and in order for Plessy to be utilized in this way, there had to be 
a test case.  In order for there to be a test case, there had to be an arrest.  In 
order for Plessy to be arrested, since he phenotypically appeared to be a 
white man, somebody had to communicate to local authorities that this guy 
was about to break the law by getting on the wrong train car and therefore, 
needed to be arrested.  If this is the case, then how did local authorities 
know? 
Local authorities knew of this case because it was a test case arranged 
with the railroad’s cooperation.14  The attorneys went to the railroads and 
basically sought out one that would agree to a test case.15  Now, in 1896, 
why would the railroads agree to a test case?  From the railroad’s 
perspective, one of the stories that is told about Plessy is that this is an 
instance in which race discrimination was economically burdensome;16 that 
is, it was economically inefficient to have to maintain separate cars.17  In 
addition, it was particularly inefficient because depending on what state you 
were in, a particular fraction of so-called black blood determined whether a 
person was considered black.18  If you crossed the state from one to another, 
a person that is classified as black in State A may not have been classified 
as black in State B.19 
One of the stories told about Plessy is one in which you see the market, 
or the free market, as a force that is resisting racial discrimination in the 
name of economic progress.  In this story, racial segregation and later 
discrimination is economically inefficient. 
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The contemporary version of this story can be told by looking at Grutter 
v. Bollinger20 and Gratz v. Bollinger.21  These are the two affirmative action 
cases that came down in 2003 in which the University of Michigan’s 
admissions policy was challenged on the grounds that it violated the equal 
protection clause.  One thing that is interesting in these cases is an amicus 
brief filed by none other than General Motors.22  General Motors filed on 
behalf of the University of Michigan and, along with some Fortune 500 
companies, made an interesting argument in their amicus brief. 
“General Motors employs 388,000 people, including 193,000 in the 
United States [with annual revenues exceeding $175 billion].”23  General 
Motors situates itself as a major global player.  I find this interesting 
because they are always talking about GM bleeding money, as though it is 
on the ropes.  $175 billion. 
General Motors filed an amicus brief and it said the reason it filed the 
brief was  
to explain that the Nation’s interest in safeguarding the freedom of 
academic institutions to select racially and ethnically diverse 
student bodies is compelling:  the future of American business and, 
in some measure, of the American economy depends on it. . . . 
[O]nly a well educated, diverse work force, comprising people 
who have learned to work productively and creatively with 
individuals from a multitude of races and ethnic, religious, and 
cultural backgrounds, can maintain America’s competitiveness in 
the increasingly diverse and interconnected world economy.  [The 
maintenance of global markets requires the development of 
business elites that have acquired cross-cultural skills].24 
What we see here is the corporate articulation of racial justice as good 
business; that is, that cross-cultural competence is crucial in serving global 
markets.25  Again the story is one in which a major corporate power aligns 
itself with racial justice in the interest of diversity because diversity is 
economically rational and wealth maximizing.  Of course, that is not the 
whole story. 
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If we take a look at the corporation through the lens of employment 
discrimination law, we see quite a different face.  We see pervasive and 
rampant racial discrimination in both overt and subtle forms.  The overt 
may be known to many of you.  One case in particular involved RR 
Donnelly, a printing press in Chicago that closed a south-side plant in 1994.  
Over six hundred black employees sued,26 alleging that there had been 
systemic racial discrimination in many forms, including the misuse of 
temporary employment policies that allowed people to work for twenty-
three months, one month short of the two years required to become 
permanent employees and secure health benefits.  Instead of hiring the 
employees, the company would lay them off.27  There were also charges of 
a racially hostile work environment; that is, supervisors failed to intervene 
when black workers were harassed.28  One employee told a story about 
being forced to eat his lunch out of a garbage can.29  There were Ku Klux 
Klan symbols30 and nooses31 all around. 
Similar allegations about denial of opportunity and hostile work 
environments have been made at Kodak, BellSouth, Texaco, and Sodexho, 
which is a food service giant affiliated with Marriott.32  Interestingly, 
Sodexho has taken on the contracts for food services at many universities 
and colleges across the country.33 
A 2002 study published by Alfred and Ruth Blumrosen, at Rutgers 
University, points out that discrimination is pervasive in the workplace.34  
Looking at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
reports from 1995 to 1999, the EEOC reports indicate that while there have 
been significant gains for racial minorities in terms of jobs and positions, 
nearly 40 percent of the 200,000 companies studied discriminated against 
racial minorities in at least one occupational category.35  Both researchers 
were looking at underutilization, such as situations where there were clearly 
qualified racial minorities being underutilized in companies.36 
Blumrosen estimates that this intentional job discrimination affected over 
two million workers among large and medium sized employers.37  Among 
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these employers, 22,000 were characterized as severe and were found 
responsible for approximately one-half of all intentional discrimination.38 
To put it bluntly, the prevailing idea that intentional job discrimination is 
a thing of the past or the acts of a few isolated companies is simply wrong.  
Yet the idea that affirmative action is no longer necessary has taken hold 
because of these assumptions.  In some people’s minds, affirmative action 
amounts to some kind of overcorrection. 
At the same time, through the lens of employment discrimination law, we 
see this pervasive pattern of employment discrimination by corporate actors 
as both the law and the courts have become more hostile to employment 
discrimination claims.39  Employment discrimination law has been an uphill 
battle for about the last twenty years.40  And several academics have tried to 
take an empirical look, and what they found is pretty scary.  At the pretrial 
stage, 80–95 percent of employment cases have been decided for 
defendants.41  That is, at the summary judgment level you are out the 
door—that is it.  We can compare that with 66 percent of insurance cases in 
which defendants have received a summary judgment in their favor.42 
Similarly, in California a study was done which indicated that 
employment discrimination cases are very hard to win, and when you 
exclude sexual harassment cases from the data, it even shows that those 
cases are much harder to win.  In other words, sexual harassment cases are 
not easy to win, but they are easier to win than race discrimination cases. 
According to a study by David Oppenheimer, “the discrimination cases 
that are hardest to win are hardest to win when brought by non-whites and 
particularly black women alleging race discrimination and women over 
forty alleging race discrimination.”43  God forbid that you should be a black 
woman over forty.44  You are dead. 
Non-whites also do dramatically worse on appeal.45  When employers 
win at the trial level, only 5.8 percent of their judgments are reversed on 
appeal.46  When plaintiffs win at the trial level, 43.6 percent of their 
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judgments are reversed on appeal.  So, even if you manage to get through 
those hurdles and get a trial verdict, it is not safe from the appellate court. 
In addition to the question of hostility to the courts, we also see the 
corporate actors as major players in resisting any sort of changes in anti-
discrimination law that might change some of these statistics.  The history 
of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, which amended Title VII, 
includes the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. 
v. Atonio.47   This case shows one of the more stark cases of employment 
discrimination that emerges out of contemporary American legal lore 
involving a cannery in Alaska which had a very isolated work area.48  This 
particular workforce was predominantly made up of Asian and white 
people.49  In the workforce, the whites had all the managerial positions, all 
the skill craft positions, and Asians were relegated to line work.50  In this 
work environment, because it was seasonal work, the line workers had 
separate cafeterias and living quarters from the managers, creating a 
plantation kind of orientation or organization of the living space.51 
The Supreme Court in Wards Cove said the work environment in the 
cannery did not violate Title VII.52  It did not amount to disparate impact.53  
It did not amount to disparate treatment.54  For those of us that are old 
enough to remember the senior President Bush, he argued, along with all of 
his corporate sponsors, that any amendments in the law amounted to an 
attempt to institute a quota bill.55  The magic language of quota was thrown 
around as the corporate powers resisted any efforts to strengthen anti-
discrimination law. 
What is my point?  What explains this seeming contradiction between the 
corporate commitment to diversity on the one hand that we see in Grutter,56 
and the simultaneous face of blatant, as well as more subtle, forms of job 
discrimination?  In part, I think this contradiction actually inheres in the 
very structure of our equality discourse from the beginning. 
If we take a look at the Fourteenth Amendment and the language and the 
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, what does it do?  First, the 
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language within the Fourteenth Amendment says, “No state shall 
[discriminate].”57 The language of the Fourteenth Amendment on its face 
sets up this dichotomy between public and private power in which only 
public power is subject to the reach of the equal protection guarantee.58  It 
carves out the entire domain of private power, corporations, as being 
beyond the reach of constitutional law. 
Now, of course, we have reached to some extent into that domain through 
the statutory mechanism of Title VII.  But that is clearly not enough and 
clearly subject to the political money that the other speakers have talked 
about.  Not only was corporate power left out of the picture right from the 
very beginning, but the early Fourteenth Amendment cases extended the 
protection of the amendment to corporations which were declared to be 
Fourteenth Amendment persons, right? 
In other words, corporations are Fourteenth Amendment persons.59  They 
are entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.60  This is 
happening at the same time that the court is essentially gutting the 
Fourteenth Amendment of any meaning in terms of its protections for 
racially subordinated people.  This leaves the private domain free of 
regulation. 
That fundamental omission basically means that racial justice is subject 
to the corporate determination of when racial justice converges with its 
economic interest.  It explains why a corporation could sign on to a brief in 
Grutter because it is diversity that it is advancing, not the eradication of 
present racial discrimination, which it does not acknowledge anywhere.61  
Anywhere.  There is nothing in that brief that would give you the remotest 
sign that any of these corporate actors have been hauled into court, maybe 
successfully or not, but hauled into court for this kind of rampant and 
blatant discrimination. 
What does that leave us with?  That leaves us with a need to disrupt the 
separation between public and private power.  At the heart of what we are 
talking about is a set of arrangements in which private corporate power has 
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been given carte blanche.  I think that at the end of the day what we need to 
recognize is that some of this stuff is not just about tinkering at the edges.  I 
think, as some of the speakers have mentioned, we are talking about 
fundamental restructuring.  And part of it has to do with really rethinking 
our understanding of the relationship between public and private 
empowerment and race. 
                     
∗ This text is a transcript from panel discussion at University of California at Los 
Angeles School of Law on April 9, 2005 as part of the conference, New Strategies for 
Justice: Linking Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, cosponsored by 
UCLA Law School and the Center on Corporations, Law & Society at Seattle University 
School of Law.  Transcripts from the other panelists, Julie A. Su and John C. Bonifaz, are 
also featured in this volume. 
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